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Abstract—With powerful parallel computing GPUs and mas-
sive user data, neural-network-based deep learning can well
exert its strong power in problem modeling and solving, and
has archived great success in many applications such as image
classification, speech recognition and machine translation etc.
While deep learning has been increasingly popular, the problem
of privacy leakage becomes more and more urgent. Given the fact
that the training data may contain highly sensitive information,
e.g., personal medical records, directly sharing them among the
users (i.e., participants) or centrally storing them in one single
location may pose a considerable threat to user privacy.
In this paper, we present a practical privacy-preserving
collaborative deep learning system that allows users to coop-
eratively build a collective deep learning model with data of
all participants, without direct data sharing and central data
storage. In our system, each participant trains a local model
with their own data and only shares model parameters with the
others. To further avoid potential privacy leakage from sharing
model parameters, we use functional mechanism to perturb the
objective function of the neural network in the training process
to achieve -differential privacy. In particular, for the first time,
we consider the existence of unreliable participants, i.e., the
participants with low-quality data, and propose a solution to
reduce the impact of these participants while protecting their
privacy. We evaluate the performance of our system on two
well-known real-world datasets for regression and classification
tasks. The results demonstrate that the proposed system is robust
against unreliable participants, and achieves high accuracy close
to the model trained in a traditional centralized manner while
ensuring rigorous privacy protection.
Index Terms—Collaborative learning, deep learning, privacy
I. INTRODUCTION
Qian Wang’s research is supported in part by the NSFC under Grants
61822207 and U1636219, the Equipment Pre-Research Joint Fund of Ministry
of Education of China (Youth Talent) under Grant 6141A02033327, the
Outstanding Youth Foundation of Hubei Province under Grant 2017CFA047,
and the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities under Grant
2042019kf0210. Qin Zou’s research is supported in part by the NSFC under
Grants 61872277 and 41571437, the Natural Science Foundation of Hubei
Province under Grant 2018CFB482. Yanjiao Chen’s research is supported
by the NSFC under Grant 61702380, the Natural Science Foundation of
Hubei Province under Grant 2017CFB134, the Hubei Provincial Technolog-
ical Innovation Special Funding Major Projects under Grant 2017AAA125.
(Corresponding author: Qin Zou)
L. Zhao and Q. Wang are with the School of Cyber Science and Engi-
neering, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, Hubei, China, and also with The
State Key Laboratory of Cryptography, P.O. Box 5159, Beijing 100878, China.
Email: {lczhaocs, qianwang}@whu.edu.cn.
Q. Zou and Y. Chen are with the School of Computer Science,
Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, Hubei, China. Email: {qzou, chenyan-
jiao}@whu.edu.cn.
Y. Zhang is with the Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd, Shenzhen 518129,
Guangdong, China. Email: zhangyan113@huawei.com. Work done primarily
at the School of Computer Science, Wuhan University, China
IN the past few years, deep learning has demonstratedlargely improved performance over traditional machine-
learning methods in various applications, e.g., image under-
standing [1], [2], speech recognition [3], [4], cancer anal-
ysis [5], [6], and the game of Go [7]. The great success
of deep learning is owing to the development of powerful
computing processor and the availability of massive data for
training the neural networks. In general, the deep learning
model will be more accurate if trained with more diverse
data, and it motivates companies and institutions to collect as
much data as possible from their users. These data are usually
generated by sensors on users’ personal devices, e.g., GPS,
cameras, smartphones, and heart rate sensors [8] etc. From the
perspective of privacy, however, user-generated data is usually
highly sensitive, e.g., location information, personal medical
records, and social relationships etc. To gather these sensitive
data at a centralized location will raise serious concerns about
privacy leakage. A recent regulation of EU [9] stipulates that
companies should carefully collect and use users’ personal
data, and users have the right to require the company to
permanently ‘forget’ their data. The bill also prohibits any
automated individual decision-making (e.g., personal financial
situation, personal health condition, and location prediction)
based on the data, and it may greatly affect the machine-
learning tasks performed by companies. In addition, in many
sectors especially medical industry, sharing personal data is
forbidden by laws or regulations.
To gain the benefit of machine learning while protecting
the user privacy, there is a rising interest in designing privacy-
assured machine learning algorithms from both academia and
industry. Existing solutions for traditional machine learning
algorithms mainly exploit intrinsic features of the algorithms,
e.g., strict convex objective functions. Privacy-preserving tech-
niques such as secure multi-party computation or differential
privacy have been applied to linear and logistic regression
analysis [10], [11], k-means clustering [12], support vector
machines [13], and crowd machine learning [14]. In recent
years, privacy-preserving deep learning has received much
attention from the research community. In [15], in order to
hide the private data, only the intermediate representations
obtained by a local neural network are published. However,
this scheme did not provide a rigorous privacy guarantee since
some sensitive information can be inferred from intermediate
features. In [16], homomorphic encryption was first applied
to convolutional neural networks (CNNs), where the model
was trained in a centralized manner, and it required extensive
computation resources. Subsequently, many other works tried
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to make inferences on encrypted data, e.g., [17]–[21], etc.
However, although the recent schemes have improved the effi-
ciency significantly, they often lead to much higher overheads
as compared to computing on the original plaintext data.
To enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of privacy-
preserving machine learning approaches, a number of differ-
ential privacy based methods have been proposed. In [22],
a differentially-private stochastic gradient descent algorithm
together with a mechanism to accurately track the privacy loss
during training were designed, which could train deep neural
networks with a modest privacy budget and a manageable
model quality. But the scheme still depends on the number of
training epochs and some empirical parameters (e.g., the lot
size, and the clipping bound). In [23], differential privacy was
applied to a specific deep learning model–deep auto-encoder,
and sensitivity analysis and noise insertion were conducted on
data reconstruction and cross-entropy error objective functions.
In [24], a framework called DSSGD was proposed to ensure
differential privacy for distributed deep networks. In recent
years, some attacks try to extract alternative information
from the machine learning process, e.g., model inversion
attacks [25], membership inference attacks [26], and model
extraction attacks [27]. In particular, by utilizing generative
adversarial network (GAN), the authors in [28] claimed that a
distributed deep learning approach cannot protect the training
sets of honest participants even if the model is trained in a
privacy-preserving manner like [24]. However, it was declared
in [29] that the scheme in [28] cannot truly break the rigorous
differential privacy.
In this paper, we investigate the problem of collaborative
deep learning with strong privacy protection while maintaining
a high data utility. In our model, users, i.e., participants,
cooperatively learn a collective deep learning model that can
benefit from the data of all users. Our work is most related
to [22]–[24], [30], but is quite different in several aspects.
The proposed schemes in [22] and [23] were not designed for
the collaborative deep learning setting. In [24], participants
only shared a subset of parameters with the others to reduce
communication costs, and differential privacy is achieved by
inserting noises to truncated weights. All the above solutions
have their own limitations. The consumed privacy budget
during the learning process is relatively high for every single
parameter. The total privacy budget is proportional to the
number of parameters, which may be in the tens of thousands
in deep learning models. The parameter that tunes the fraction
of uploaded gradients is used to quantify the privacy, but
each pixel in the training data may be revealed by multiple
gradients. Compared with [24], the scheme in [30] considers
providing client-level differential privacy which can hide the
existence of participants, and uses the moment accountant
technique in [22] to track the privacy loss. However, both
methods did not consider the scenario that the data quality
of certain participants may be poor, which may degrade the
performance of collaborative learning.
To address the above issues, in our design, each participant,
e.g., a mobile user or medical institution, maintains a local
neural network model and a local dataset that may be highly
sensitive. Instead of sharing local data with the central server,
the participant only uploads the updated parameters of the
local model generated from the local dataset. The central
server derives the global parameters for the collective model
using the updates from all participants. Although parameter
sharing can prevent direct exposure of the local data, the
information of sensitive data may be indirectly disclosed.
To solve this problem, we utilize differential privacy [31]
to obtain the sanitized parameters to minimize the privacy
leakage. Unlike [24] where noise is directly injected to the
gradients, we apply functional mechanism [32] to perturb
the objective function of the neural network, and obtain the
sanitized parameters by minimizing the perturbed objective
function.
In collaborative learning, the quality of data contributed by
different participants may be very diverse. Different terminal
devices or people may have different capacities to generate
the training data, and there may exist unpredictable random
errors during data collection and storage. Participants with
low quality data are referred to as unreliable participants
(discussed in detail in Section II-A). To make the learning
process fair and non-discriminative, we consider the ‘data
quality’ as one of the privacy concerns of participants, which
should not be inferred by other participants during the learning
process. We adopt exponential mechanism to protect this
privacy while effectively learning an accurate model. Our main
contributions are summarized as follows.
• To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to investi-
gate the problem of privacy-preserving collaborative deep
learning by taking into account the existence of unreliable
participants.
• We present a novel scheme called SecProbe, which allows
participants to share model parameters, and deals with un-
reliable participants by utilizing exponential mechanism.
SecProbe can protect the data privacy for each participant
while effectively learning an accurate model.
• We derive the approximate polynomial form of the objec-
tive function in a neural network with two different loss
functions, and use functional mechanism to inject noises
to the coefficients to achieve differential privacy without
consuming too much privacy budget. We show that it is
easy to extend and apply our method to networks with
more layers.
• We evaluate the performance of SecProbe on two well-
known real-world datasets for regression and classifica-
tion tasks. The results demonstrate that SecProbe is robust
to unreliable participants, and achieves high accuracy
close to the solution obtained in the traditional centralize-
trained model, while providing a rigorous privacy guar-
antee.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we introduce the problem statement, some
preliminary knowledge of deep learning, differential privacy
and functional mechanism used in our design.
A. Problem Statement
In this paper, we consider the generic setting of privacy-
preserving distributed collaborative deep learning. As shown
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Fig. 1: A collaborative deep learning system with unreliable
participants
in Figure 1, in our model, each participant may have its own
sensitive data, and it would like to learn a model benefiting
from both its own data and those of the others.
In particular, instead of making the assumption that all the
participants are ‘reliable’, i.e., the data held by each participant
is balanced and has the same or similar quality, we consider
a more practical model where there may exist a small group
of participants who are ‘unreliable’ during some phases of
the whole learning process. That is, a portion of data held by
unreliable participants is not always as accurate as data held
by others, and thus their uploaded parameters may disturb the
learning accuracy.
In our daily lives, unreliable participants are common in
a collaborative learning system. Consider a typical scenario
where several hospitals aim to learn a model together for
cancer prediction for patients. There may exist non-negligible
gaps in the quality of data among different hospitals since
a rich-experienced chief physician with advanced medical
devices in a high-rate hospital will be more likely to produce
accurate data than an junior physician with low-end of devices
in an ordinary hospital. Note that, it does not mean that
the data in the ordinary hospital are all and/or always ‘bad’.
Actually, every participant might have some bad data in some
phases of their training process when more and more data
are being gathered into their local dataset, because there are
so many possibilities to go wrong in the data generation and
storage procedures. Consequently, the existence of unreliable
participants will bring non-ignorable disturbance during the
collaborative training process, which may finally result in an
inaccurate or even useless model.
Therefore, the problem is how to design a privacy-
preserving collaborative deep learning system, which can
reduce the impact of unreliable participants on the learned
model, and avoid the leakage of participants’ privacy from the
training data and the trained models.
Threat Model. In our scheme, we assume that the server is
honest-but-curious and non-colluding, i.e., it always follows
the protocol, and will not reveal the information of participants
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Fig. 2: A neural network with multiple hidden layers
or collude with any participant. The participants might be
malicious, each participant (or a set of colluding participants)
might try to infer other participants’ local data and their data
quality from the trained model, or upload false parameters/data
deliberately into the system.
In addition, to achieve stronger security, we will discuss how
to deal with the untrusted server by introducing anonymity
communication techniques in Section III-D.
B. Deep Learning
Broadly speaking, deep learning, based on artificial neural
networks, aims to learn and extract high-level abstractions in
data and build a network model to describe accurate relations
between inputs and outputs. Common deep learning models
are usually constructed by multi-layer networks, where non-
linear functions are embedded, so that more complicated
underlying features and relations can be learned in different
layers. Interested readers can refer to thorough surveys or
reviews in [33], [34].
There are multiple forms of deep learning models, e.g.,
multi-layer perceptron (MLP), convolutional neural network
(CNN), recurrent neural network (RNN) [35]. Different mod-
els fit for different types of problems, and among all of those
models, MLP is a very common and representative form of
deep learning architecture. Specifically, MLP is a kind of
feed-forward neural network, where each neuron receives the
outputs of neurons from the previous layer. Figure 2 shows a
typical MLP with multiple hidden layers. Each neuron has an
activation function which is usually non-linear. As shown, for
a neuron in a hidden layer, say j, the output of the neuron
is calculated by hj = f(W
(1)
j x), where W
(1)
j is the weight
vector which determines the contribution of each input signal
to the neuron j, x is the input of the model, and f is the
activation function. The activation function is usually non-
linear, capturing the complicated non-linear relation between
the output and input. Typical examples are sigmoid function
f(x) = (1 + e−x)−1, ReLU function f(x) = max(0, x), and
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hyperbolic tangent f(x) = e
2x−1
e2x+1 . In this work, we will focus
on an MLP model, where ReLU function is applied.
Training a neural network, i.e., learning the parameters
(weights) of the network, is a non-convex optimization prob-
lem. The typical algorithms used to solve the problem are
different types of gradient descent methods [36]. In this paper,
we will consider a supervised learning task, e.g., regression
analysis, and assume the output of the network is z. Suppose
the data we use to train the network is a tuple (xi, yi), where
xi denotes the network input and yi is the label. Consequently,
we can use loss (objective) function to measure the difference
between the network output and the real training label, e.g.,
Errori = (zi − yi)2. We then can use back propagation [37]
algorithm to propagate the error back to the neurons, compute
the contribution of each neuron to this error, and adjust the
weights accordingly to reduce the training error. The adjust-
ment procedure for a weight, say wj , is wj = wj − l ∂Errori∂wj ,
where l is the learning rate.
Among various gradient descent algorithms, stochastic gra-
dient descent (SGD) [38] is considered to be especially fit for
optimizing highly non-convex problems for its high efficiency
and effectiveness. This algorithm brings stochastic factors into
the training process, which helps the model to escape from lo-
cal optimum. For a large training dataset, SGD first randomly
samples a small subset (mini-batch) of the whole dataset, then
computes the gradients over the mini-batch and updates the
weights, e.g., for weight wj . After one iteration on the mini-
batch, the new wj is computed by wj = wj− l ∂Errorb∂wj , where
Errorb is the loss function computed on the mini-batch b. In
our work, we will apply SGD to each participant to train its
local model.
C. Differential Privacy
Differential privacy has become a de facto standard privacy
model for statistics analysis with provable privacy guarantee,
and has been widely used in data publishing [39], [40] and
data analysis [41], [42]. Intuitively, a mechanism satisfies
differential privacy if its outputs are approximately the same
even if a single record in the dataset is arbitrarily changed, so
that an adversary infers no more information from the outputs
about the record owner than from the dataset where the record
is absent.
Definition 1 (Differential Privacy [31]): A privacy mech-
anism M gives -differential privacy, where  > 0, if for any
datasets D and D
′
differing on at most one record, and for
all sets S ⊆ Range(M),
Pr[M(D) ∈ S] ≤ exp() · Pr[M(D′) ∈ S], (1)
where  is the privacy budget representing the privacy level
the mechanism provides. Generally speaking, a smaller 
guarantees a stronger privacy level, but also requires a larger
perturbation noise.
Definition 2 (Sensitivity [43]): For any function f : D →
Rd, the sensitivity of f w.r.t. D is
∆(f) = max
D,D′∈D
||f(D)− f(D′)||1 (2)
for all D and D
′
differing on at most one record.
Laplace mechanism is the most commonly used mechanism
that satisfies -differential privacy. Its main idea is to add
noise drawn from a Laplace distribution into the datasets to
be published.
Theorem 1 (Laplace Mechanism [43]): For any function
f : D → Rd, the Laplace Mechanism M for any dataset
D ∈ D,
M(D) = f(D) + 〈Lap(∆(f)/)〉d (3)
satisfies -differential privacy, where the noise Lap(∆(f)/)
is drawn from a Laplace distribution with mean zero and scale
∆(f)/.
Obviously, the Laplace mechanism only fits for numeric
query. Thus, for the query whose outputs are not numeric,
Mcsherry et al. [44] proposed Exponential mechanism that
selects an output r from the output domain R.
Theorem 2 (Exponential Mechanism [44]): Let ∆u be
the sensitivity of the utility function u: (D × R) → R, the
mechanism M for any dataset D ∈ D,
M(D,u) = choose r ∈ R with probability ∝ exp(u(D, r)
2∆u
)
(4)
gives -differential privacy.
This theorem implies that the Exponential mechanism can
make high utility outputs exponentially more likely at a rate
that mainly depends on the utility score such that the final
output would be approximately optimum with respect to u,
and meanwhile provide rigorous privacy guarantee.
The composition properties of differential privacy provide
privacy guarantee for a sequence of computations.
Theorem 3 (Sequential Composition [45]): Let M1, M2,
· · · , Mr be a set of mechanisms and each Mi provides
i-differential privacy. Let M be another mechanism that
executesM1(D), · · · ,Mr(D) using independent randomness
for each Mi. Then M satisfies (
∑
i i)-differential privacy.
Theorem 4 (Parallel Composition [45]): Let Mi each
provide i-differential privacy. A sequence of Mi(Di)’s over
disjoint datasets Di provide max(i)-differential privacy.
These theorems allow us to distribute the privacy budget
among r mechanisms to realize -differential privacy.
D. Functional Mechanism
Functional mechanism (FM) [32] is a general framework for
regression analysis with differential privacy. It can be seen as
an extension of the Laplace mechanism which ensures privacy
by perturbing the optimization goal of regression analysis
instead of injecting noise directly into the regression results.
A typical regression analysis on dataset D returns a model
parameter w˙ that minimizes the optimization (objective) func-
tion fD(w) =
∑
xi∈D f(xi, w). However, directly releasing
w˙ would raise privacy concern, since the parameters reveal
information about dataset D and function fD(w). In order
to achieve differential privacy, we use FM to firstly perturb
the objective function fD(w) (by exploiting the polynomial
representation of fD(w)), and then release the parameter w¯
that minimizes the perturbed objective function f¯D(w).
We assume w is a vector containing d values w1, . . . , wd.
Let φ(w) denote the product of w1, . . . , wd, i.e., φ(w) =
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Algorithm 1 A high-level description of SecProbe
1: Build the models and initialize all parameters
2: for each communication round do
3: for each participant i do
4: for iteration j = 1 to I do
5: Run SGD independently on the local dataset using
the perturbed loss function
6: end for
7: Upload W¯i to the server
8: end for
9: The server chooses to accept W¯i according to the
computed utility score.
10: The server conducts model average to obtain Wnew and
send it to each participant.
11: end for
wc11 · wc22 · · ·wcdd , where c1, . . . , cd ∈ N . Let Φj(j ∈ N)
denote the set of all products of w1, . . . , wd with degree j,
i.e., Φj = {wc11 · wc22 · · ·wcdd |
∑d
l=1 cl = j}. By the Stone-
Weierstrass Theorem [46], any continuous and differentiable
function f(w) can always be written as a polynomial of
w1, . . . , wd, i.e., f(xi, w) =
∑J
j=0
∑
φ∈Φj λφxiΦ(w), where
λφxi ∈ R denotes the coefficient of φ(w) in the polynomial,
and J ∈ [0,∞]. Similarly, we can derive the polynomial
function of fD(w) as
fD(w) =
J∑
j=0
∑
φ∈Φj
∑
xi∈D
λφxiΦ(w). (5)
Lemma 1: ( [32]) Let D and D′ be any two neighboring
databases. Let fD(w) and f ′D(w) be the objective functions of
regression analysis on D and D′, respectively. Then, we have
the following inequality
∆ =
J∑
j=1
∑
φ∈Φj
∥∥∥∥ ∑
xi∈D
λφxi −
∑
xi∈D′
λφ
x
′
i
∥∥∥∥
1
≤ 2 max
x
J∑
j=1
∑
φ∈Φj
‖λφx‖1.
To achieve -differential privacy, FM perturbs fD(w) by
injecting Laplace noise into its polynomial coefficients. Ac-
cording to Lemma 1, fD(w) is perturbed by injecting Laplace
noise with scale of Lap(∆/) into the polynomial coefficients
λ(φ), where ∆ = 2 max
x
∑J
j=1
∑
φ∈Φj ‖λφx‖1. Then we can
derive the model parameter w¯ which minimizes the perturbed
function f¯D(w). In this work, we propose to utilize FM in our
design to protect the privacy of participants’ local data.
III. SECPROBE: PRIVACY-PRESERVING COLLABORATIVE
DEEP LEARNING SYSTEM
A. System Architecture
In Figure 1, we assume there are N participants, and each of
them has a sensitive dataset for local training. The participants
aim to learn a common model, i.e., the architectures of
the local models are identical, and the learning objectives
are the same. There are many deficiencies and difficulties
of collecting all the data from participants in advance and
training on the entire dataset. Such complicated process of data
collection usually incurs high communication overhead, and
participants may not be willing to directly upload their data
to a third party from the perspective of privacy or business
consideration. Therefore, the participants only exchange the
parameters (weights) with others, and a server (e.g., a cloud
service provider) undertakes the job of communicating with
participants, exchanging and storing parameters. In our model,
we assume there exists a global model and an auxiliary
validation dataset on the server. This dataset can be very small,
and it is easy to be obtained in practice. For example, the
data can be collected from participants who have already been
expired with no privacy concern or publicly well-tested hand-
classified datasets (such as MNIST [47]).
Algorithm 1 gives the high-level steps of SecProbe. The
server and participants build their own models and initialize
all the parameters before the learning starts. For each commu-
nication round, the participants locally train their own models
using SGD in a differentially private way. After I times of
iteration, the participants upload the perturbed parameters to
the server. The server then uses the auxiliary validation data to
compute a utility score for each participant, and then chooses
to accept the parameters with certain probability. Next, the
averaged model parameters are computed and distributed to
each participant for the next round of local training. Note that
the participant can terminate its training procedure and drop
out from the system at any time if it believes its model is
accurate enough, and meanwhile a new participant can also
join into the system at anytime. We next describe the detailed
procedures of SecProbe on the server side and the participant
side, respectively.
B. SecProbe: The Server Part
Algorithm 2 gives the pseudocode of SecProbe on the server
side. The server first initializes the parameters and waits for the
local training results from each participant. When the number
of participants who upload their weights to the server reaches a
pre-fixed threshold M, the server stops receiving the uploaded
data and sends a stop signal to notify other participants that
there is no need to upload weights (in step 2). The parameter
M is used to control the number of participants that the
server plans to utilize per round and meanwhile saves a lot of
communication costs. Alternatively, this procedure can also be
achieved by randomly assigning a set of M participants at the
beginning of each round. These two approaches have their own
advantages and both can be used in our design. The former
can intrinsically deal with the occurrence of failed uploads,
while the latter can save a lot of computation costs on the
participant side. Without loss of generality, we adopt the first
approach in the description of Algorithm 2.
As discussed above, the existence of unreliable participants
indicates that the parameters uploaded by them may be dis-
ruptive, and it may reduce the accuracy of the global model.
To reduce their effect on the model accuracy, we measure
the data quality of these unreliable participants by calculating
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Algorithm 2 SecProbe on the server side
1: Initialize parameters W0 and send them to each participant
2: Wait for participants to upload their weights until there
are already M participants’ weights W¯1, W¯2, . . . , W¯M
3: Calculate the accuracy score u(G,D,m) for each upload-
ing participant by running the model with weights from
each of them over the auxiliary validation dataset
4: Sample K participants from M without
replacement such that Pr[Selecting participant m] ∝
exp( 2K∆uu(G,D,m))
5: Average the K weights and obtain Wnew = 1K
∑K
i=1 W¯i
6: Send the new averaged weights to all participants
7: Repeat steps 2-6 until there is no participant in the system
a utility score for each participant. Specifically, the server
runs the model on the auxiliary validation dataset D with the
weights of each of M participants respectively and obtains a
utility score for participant m. Let G = [W¯1, . . . , W¯m] denote
the set of uploaded weights, where each item can be used
to infer the data quality of each participant. For a regression
task, suppose the dataset has d samples, we define a scoring
function u(G,D,m) as
u(G,D,m) =
1
d
d∑
i
(1− |max(zi, 3yi)− yi
yi
|), (6)
where zi is the output of the model with parameter G(m),
and yi is the real value from the auxiliary validation data.
Without loss of generality, we assume that yi is in range [0, 1].
The scoring function calculates an accuracy score for each
participant m.
If the server chooses the participants only according to
the scoring function without any uncertainty, the participants
could easily infer which participants hold the low-quality data
by comparing their own parameters and the new parameters
sent from the server. In SecProbe, we utilize the exponential
mechanism to inject uncertainty into the sampling procedure
against this kind of inference. The server samples K partici-
pants without replacement such that
Pr[Selecting participant m] ∝ exp( 
2K∆u
u(G,D,m)). (7)
However, the sensitivity of calculating 1 − | zi−yiyi | is un-
scalable since the proportion of zi to yi is infinite in theory. If
zi ≤ 3yi, the value will be within [−1, 1]. We observe that this
condition always holds in practice, as the predicted parameter
zi does not deviate from the real value yi for more than three
times1. To this end, we place a restriction on the output zi, i.e.,
replacing zi in Eq. (6) with max(3yi, zi). If zi ≤ 3yi, it will
be clipped to avoid the unbounded sensitivity. By adding this
restriction, the sensitivity can be bounded to 1. Experimental
results show that this design will not affect the accuracy of
the learned model.
1We find that the average of | zi−yi
yi
| is always less than 1 based on our
experimental results in Section IV
Moreover, for a classification task, the scoring function u
can be defined as the correct prediction rate directly.
Lemma 2: The sensitivity of the prediction accuracy for
classification is ∆u = 12 .
Proof: Let m and n denote the number of correct predictions
and the number of samples respectively. The sensitivity is ∆ =
m+1
n+1 − mn = n−mn(n+1) . Since n ≥ 1 and n ≥ m, the maximum
of ∆u is 12 when n = 1 and m = 0. 
Remarks. In this step, the goal is to make the participants
in the collaborative learning process non-discriminative. To
achieve this, we use the exponential mechanism to prevent
adversaries from knowing the performances of uploaded mod-
els, i.e., the utility scores. The privacy of the participants’
training data will be considered in the next step. As it is unfair
to measure the performance of the participants’ own data, a
reliable dataset is required for evaluation, e.g., a validation
dataset on the server. In our design, since the performance of
the model is reflected by the prediction accuracy, we protect
the prediction values on the validation dataset. Specifically, the
server constructs a centralized virtual dataset which has the
same number of records with the original validation dataset,
and each record has M attributes which represent the predic-
tion results (the clipped zi for regression, or the correctness
for classification) on the M participants’ models. Then, the
neighboring dataset consists of two virtual datasets which are
different in only one row. Suppose a query asks: “which model
has the best quality?”. This query can be regarded as “which
model gets the highest utility score on the auxiliary validation
dataset?”. Obviously, the effect of removing or adding one
record in the virtual dataset on the utility score is the sensitivity
as above. For the regression task, the summation term in
Eq. (6) is in range [-1, 1]. So, changing one record in the
virtual dataset could place an impact on the utility score no
larger than 1. For the classification task, adding or removing
one record will affect the number of correct predictions. As
the neighboring dataset is non-empty, the maximum influence
on the utility score is 12 .
Theorem 5: The sampling procedure in Algorithm 2 (line
4) satisfies -differential privacy.
Proof: Proof sketch. Because sampling one participant con-
sumes K budget and satisfies

K -differential privacy according
to Theorem 2, the sampling procedure which samples K
participants will satisfy KK -differential privacy. 
Note that Theorem 5 only ensures that this sampling pro-
cedure satisfies -differential privacy at the current training
iteration. Due to the composition properties of differential
privacy, the privacy level provided by it may degrade during
training. We will discuss in detail which privacy level our
mechanism will provide during the whole training process in
the privacy analysis of this section.
Remarks. The above procedure samples a set of partici-
pants at an exponential rate based on the scoring function
while preventing the sampling procedure from leaking pri-
vacy. Therefore, the real quality of uploaded weights from a
participant cannot be inferred by others since the new weights
are computed on a set of privately-chosen participants, and
the system can sample the approximately optimal weights and
eliminate the disturbance of unreliable participants as much
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Algorithm 3 SecProbe on the participant side
1: Download the same initialized weights W0 from the server
2: Set the mini-batch size |S| and the number of iterations
I , and perform local SGD in each communication round
3: Decompose the loss function `(S,W ) and derive an
approximated polynomial form ˆ`(S,W )
4: Obtain the perturbed loss function ¯`(S,W ) by functional
mechanism
5: for iteration j = 1 to I do
6: Run SGD with batch size |S| on the local dataset using
the perturbed loss function
7: end for
8: Upload W¯ to the server
9: Receive the new averaged weight Wnew from the server
10: Repeat steps 5-9 until an acceptable small test error is
obtained
11: Drop out of the system
as possible. It is easy to see that the time complexity of the
sampling step is O(KM). We can further significantly reduce
the running time by implementing the sampling step on a
static balanced binary tree as suggested in [48]. The improved
sampling step can run in time O(M +K ln(M)).
After choosing the final accepted weights, the server con-
ducts a model average operation that sets the new global
weights to be the average of all the accepted weights. The
server finally sends the new weights to every participant, and
waits for the next round of parameter uploading. We now
briefly explain the reason why model average operation works.
The average operation to some extent consistently inherits
the procedure of SGD by randomly choosing a mini-batch
of the training data to get the sum of errors on the mini-
batch and then computing the gradients on the error. The
average operation acts as choosing a mini-batch of the data
from all the accepted participants and computing the gradients
on the overall error. Note that, our experiments show that this
operation works well only if the parameters of each participant
are randomly initialized by the same seed, which is easy to
be implemented, e.g., the participants can download the same
initialized parameters from the server to replace their own
initializations at the very beginning.
C. SecProbe: The Participant Part
Algorithm 3 presents the pseudocode of SecProbe on the
participant side. Each participant has its own local training
dataset and conducts the standard SGD algorithm to train its
local model. Let Wi denote the network weights of participant
i. To protect the privacy of the participant’s sensitive data
being disclosed by Wi, the participant applies differential
privacy onto the training algorithm to get sanitized weights
W¯i’s, and uploads them to the server.
To achieve differential privacy, Laplace mechanism was
utilized in [24] to directly inject noise to the weights. However,
their scheme has to consume too much privacy budget for each
weight per epoch in order to achieve acceptable results. Instead
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Fig. 3: A neural network with one hidden layer
of directly injecting noise to the weights W , in our design
we propose to utilize functional mechanism [32] to perturb
the objective function of the network, train the model on the
perturbed objective function and finally compute the sanitized
weights W¯ . Since the structures of the neural networks may
be varied and often depend on specific application scenarios, it
is impossible to design a one-size-fits-all differentially-private
solution for all deep learning models. In this paper, we focus
on the most common neural network MLP. Specifically, we
first consider a three-layer fully-connected neural network,
design algorithms to train the model in a differentially-private
manner, and then show that more hidden layers can be stacked
easily by using our proposed scheme.
The regression problem usually uses mean square error
(MSE) as the loss function. Suppose the training set D has
a set of n tuples κ1, κ2, . . . , κn. For each tuple κi = (Xi, yi),
Xi contains d attributes (xi1, xi2, . . . , xid) and yi is the label
of κi. Without loss of generality, we assume each attribute in
Xi and yi is in the range [0, 1], which is easy to be satisfied by
data normalization. The MLP takes Xi as input and outputs a
prediction zi of yi as accurate as possible. Then, the objective
function can be given by
`(D,W ) =
n∑
i=1
(zi − yi)2. (8)
Recall the calculations of MLP, we have zi =
σ1(HW
(2)) and H = σ2(X
T
i W
(1)), where W (1) and
W (2) are the weight matrixes of the network (as shown in
Figure 3), σ1 is the sigmoid function, and σ2 is the ReLU
function. Note that we bound the ReLU function by [0, 1] to
avoid introducing an unbounded global sensitivity.
Consequently, for a mini-batch S sampled from the training
set D, the objective function can be written into the following
form
`(S,W ) =
|S|∑
i=1
(zi − yi)2
=
|S|∑
i=1
[y2i − 2yi[1 + e(−(ReLU(X
T
i W
(1))W
(2)
j ))]−1
+ [1 + e(−(ReLU(X
T
i W
(1))W
(2)
j ))]−2].
(9)
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFORMATION FORENSICS AND SECURITY 8
Recall that FM requires the objective function to be the
polynomial representation of weights w, thus we need to
approximate Eq. (9) and rewrite it into a polynomial form.
Since the first term of Eq. (9) is already in the polynomial
form, we only consider the other two terms. To utilize Taylor
Expansion to help approximate the functions as suggested
in [32], ∀j ∈ [1, d], we define four functions f1j , f2j , g1j and
g2j as follows.
f1 = −2yi[1 + exp(−z)]−1; f2 = [1 + exp(−z)]−2;
g1 = ReLU(XTi W
(1))W (2); g2 = ReLU(XTi W
(1))W (2).
(10)
Then, we can rewrite Eq. (9) into the following form
`(S,W ) =
|S|∑
i=1
[y2i + f1(g1(κi,W )) + f2(g2(κi,W ))]. (11)
Given the above decomposition of the original loss function,
we can then apply Taylor expansion in Eq. (11) and obtain
Eqs. (12) and (13),
˜`(S,W ) =
|S|∑
i=1
[
y2i +
2∑
l=1
∞∑
k=0
f
(k)
l (γl)
k!
(
gl(κi,W )− γl
)k]
,
(13)
where γl is a real number and without loss of generality we
set it to be zero for ease of analysis. As can be seen in
Eq. (13), the number of polynomial terms is infinite, which
may result in an unacceptable large sensitivity. Thus, we
propose to truncate Eq. (13) by cutting off all polynomial
terms with order larger than 2, i.e., we set k ∈ [0, 2]. Then
we can obtain the final polynomial objective function used for
training as Eq. (12). The influence of truncating the polynomial
and clipping the ReLU function is shown in Table I. We can
see that, both operations do not have obvious impacts on the
training accuracy.
Now we are ready to give the following lemma.
Lemma 3: Let S and S′ be any two neighboring databases.
Let ˆ`(S,W ) and ˆ`(S′,W ) be the objective functions of MLP
on S and S′ respectively. Then, the global sensitivity of the
objective function ˆ` over S and S′ is
∆ ≤ 1
2
b+
1
8
b2,
where b is the number of hidden units in the hidden layer.
Proof: Without loss of generality, we assume that S and S′
differ in the last tuple, κ|S|(κ
′
|S|). According to Lemma 1, we
have
∆ ≤ 2 max
κ
(1
4
b∑
p=1
hp +
1
16
b∑
p=1,q=1
hphq
)
≤ 2(1
4
b+
1
16
b2) =
1
2
b+
1
8
b2,
where h is the value of hidden neurons at the hidden layer. 
As can be seen, the sensitivity of the objective function
ˆ`(S,W ) only depends on the model structure, which is inde-
pendent with the cardinality of the dataset S. Finally, we inject
Laplace noise with scale ∆ to the coefficients of
ˆ`(S,W )
and obtain the perturbed objective function ¯`(S,W ), which
satisfies -differential privacy.
The classification problem usually adopts cross-entropy er-
ror as the loss function. We construct a CNN the same as [24]
which has two convolutional layers, two max pooling layers
and one hidden layer with 128 neurons and sigmoid activation
function as an example to solve the classification problem.
Similar to the regression problem, the objective function is
`(κi,W ) =
n∑
i=1
−yi log zi. (14)
The Eq. (14) can also be decomposed to three functions as
follows
f = −yi log[1 + exp(−z)]−1 and
g1 = g2 = Conv(κi)W.
Note that, Conv(κi) represents the output of the previous
pooling layer, and W is the weight matrix of the fully-
connected layer. Then, the loss function can be rewritten as
Eq. (15),
`(S,W ) = −
|S|∑
i=1
M∑
j=1
f((κi,W )). (15)
The expansion form of Eq. (15) is
˜`(S,W ) = −
|S|∑
i=1
M∑
j=1
∞∑
k=0
[f (k)l (γl)
k!
(
gl(κi,W )− γl
)k]
. (16)
The final polynomial objective function used for training is
given in Eq. (17).
Lemma 4: Let S and S′ be any two neighboring databases.
Let ˆ`(S,W ) and ˆ`(S′,W ) be the objective functions of MLP
on S and S′ respectively. The global sensitivity of the objective
function ˆ` over S and S′ is
∆M(≤ b+ 1
4
b2).
Proof: Without loss of generality, we assume that S and S′
differ in the last tuple, κ|S|(κ
′
|S|). According to Lemma 1, we
have
∆ ≤ 2M max
κ
(1
2
b∑
p=1
hp +
1
8
b∑
p=1,q=1
hphq
)
≤ 2M(1
2
b+
1
8
b2) = M(b+
1
4
b2).

We next revisit Algorithm 3. After obtaining the perturbed
loss function ¯`(S,W ), the participant performs standard SGD
algorithm with the batch size |S| and iterates for I times.
Then it gets the sanitized weights W¯ ’s of the current round
and uploads them to the server. The parameter I manages the
communication cost of the system by controlling the frequency
of updates between the participants and the server. Simply put,
the increase of I will decrease the frequency of updates and
thus reduce the communication cost. But it will also depress
the benefits from collaborative learning at the same time since
the ‘collaboration’ decreases. We will evaluate the effect of I
through extensive experiments in the next section.
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ˆ`(S,W ) =
|S|∑
i=1
[
y2i +
2∑
l=1
2∑
k=0
[f (k)l (γl)
k!
(
gl(κi,W )−γl
)k]]
=
|S|∑
i=1
[(
y2i +
2∑
l=1
f
(0)
l (0)
)
+
2∑
l=1
f
(1)
l (0)
(
ReLU(XTi W
(1))W (2)
)
+
2∑
l=1
f
(2)
l (0)
2
(
ReLU(XTi W
(1))W (2)
)2]
=
|S|∑
i=1
[
y2i − yi +
1
4
+
1− 2yi
4
(
ReLU(XTi W
(1))W (2)
)
+
1
16
(
ReLU(XTi W
(1))W (2)
)2]
(12)
ˆ`(S,W ) = −
|S|∑
i=1
M∑
j=1
2∑
k=0
[f (k)l (γl)
k!
(
gl(κi,W )− γl
)k]
=
|S|∑
i=1
[
log 2 + (
1
2
− yi)Conv(κi)W + 1
8
[Conv(κi)W ]
2
]
(17)
Dataset Baseline Clipped ReLU Truncated Polynomial
US 0.11 0.11 0.11
MNIST 96.48 95.43 95.94
SVHN 90.81 90.65 90.35
TABLE I: Accuracy of truncated functions
Scalability. In the above discussion, we focus on an MLP
model with one hidden layer for regression analysis. Based
on the above calculations, it is easy to stack more hidden
layers with ReLU function into the model to address more
complicated problems. For example, if an additional hidden
layer with b′ neurons is added, the only change of Eq. (9) is
adding the layer matrix multiplication and activation function
in the exponential. Because the output of the previous layer
is bounded to [−1, 1], the sensitivity of the loss function will
slightly change to 12b
′ + 18b
′2.
Moreover, the functional mechanism can also be applied
to other types of loss functions (e.g., huber-loss function),
other activation functions (e.g., hyperbolic tangent), and other
types of networks (e.g., Auto-Encoder or RNN) with certain
adaptations, which are beyond the scope of this paper.
D. Security Analysis
Let the privacy budget used in participant sampling and
objective function perturbation be 1 and 2 respectively. Since
the training procedure on each participant strictly follows FM,
the parameters computed from the perturbed objective function
satisfy -differential privacy in each training iteration. Let Si
be the training batch of an iteration. Since all batches are
disjoint from each other in a training epoch (e.g., Si and Si−1
contain different tuples sampled randomly from the training
data), where an epoch is one full training process that consists
of several iterations covering the whole training data, we can
conclude that the training process at each participant ensures
2-differential privacy in each epoch according to Theorem 4.
Recall that the sampling procedure in Algorithm 2 also
ensures 1-differential privacy at each sampling step. Since
it can be seen that each step of sampling protects the privacy
of the partial training data, we can conclude that the sampling
procedure in Algorithm 2 satisfies 1-differential privacy in
each epoch.
Note that the two procedures above address two different
privacy concerns respectively. In case of passive adversaries,
the procedures executed by each participant aim to protect
the privacy of the training data, focusing on each single
record of the training data, while the procedures run by the
server aim to protect the privacy of the data quality, which
takes all the corresponding records as a whole. Therefore,
we can finally conclude that SecProbe satisfies max(1, 2)-
differential privacy in each training epoch.
We further consider the effects of different behaviors by
adversaries. Firstly, if a set of participants are curious-but-
honest, they may try to infer some information from others.
But obviously, using differential privacy can prevent this
leakage. If some participants are malicious, there may be
two kinds of behaviors: 1) sending fake parameters to the
server; 2) stealing the parameters from the communication
process directly. For the first malicious behavior, thanks to the
exponential mechanism that we have introduced, it is almost
impossible for the fake parameters to significantly affect the
model, thus there is no negative effect on the training process,
and the adversaries cannot infer the data quality of other
participants. For the second one, the adversary may eavesdrop
on channels between honest participants and the server. Some
effective cryptography tools can be used to encrypt the param-
eters (e.g., AES) and verify the received data (e.g., SHA-256)
to ensure communication security. Therefore, our scheme is
robust and secure when facing malicious participants.
Furthermore, in this paper, we assume the server is honest-
but-curious and non-colluding, i.e., the server can know the
data quality of each participant after uploading, but it will not
reveal the qualities or collude with some participants. As dis-
cussed in [24], anonymous authentication and communication
techniques can help to relax this assumption by preventing the
server from linking uploaded parameters with the participants.
At the beginning of the protocol, a participant can use the
protocol in [49] to obtain enough e-tokens (e.g., in our
experimental settings, 500 is sufficient to make the learning
process converge), and in each round of communication the
participant can use an e-token to authenticate his identity and
upload the parameters. Then, the approach in [50] can be used
to prevent tracking the identity while downloading the updated
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model. Obviously, the anonymity only relies on the security
of the adopted anonymous communication protocol, the design
of which is outside the scope of this paper.
However, even if the identities of participants are protected
by the anonymity techniques, the use of differential privacy is
still essential. Considering an extreme case that if only one
participant is honest, and all the other N − 1 participants
are collusive. Obviously, the parameters of the honest one
are easy to be inferred. This is because the aggregation is
only a simple average, and some sensitive information in the
local dataset of the honest participant would be leaked from
the parameters, even if the others do not know which party
owns these information. In this scenario, differential privacy
will work as differential privacy can help protect the record
privacy even if the adversaries know all the other records in
the dataset.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the performance of SecProbe
on a real-world dataset. All experiments are conducted on a
machine with an Intel E5-2660-v2 CPU, a Quadro K5200 GPU
and 128GB RAM, running on Ubuntu 16.04.
A. Datasets
For the regression task, we use the dataset from Integrated
Public Use Microdata Series [51], named US, which contains
600,000 census records collected in US. There are 15 attributes
in the dataset, namely, Sex, Age, Race, Education, Filed of
Degree, Marital Status, Family Size, Number of Children,
Hours Work per Week, Ownership of Dwelling, Number of
Children, Number of Rooms, Private Health Insurance, Living
Difficulty and Annual Income. Among all these attributes, there
are 6 attributes that are categorical, including Race, Education,
Field of Degree, Marital Status, Private Health Insurance
and Living Difficulty. For an attribute that can only be two
possible values (e.g., male and female for sex), we set it to be
0 or 1. For the remainings, we follow the common practice
in machine learning to transform these attributes by one-hot
encoding. We then normalize the other numeric attributes into
the scope of [0, 1]. Specifically, for the Annual Income, we
apply log transformation before normalization to obtain a
relatively stable distribution [52]. After these transformations,
our dataset now has 20 attributes.
We randomly sample 90,000 records to construct the test
dataset, and 10,000 records to form the auxiliary validation
dataset on the server. The remaining 500,000 records are
randomly divided into N parts, where N is the number of
participants. The data is already shuffled before training.
We focus on a regression task predicting the value of Annual
Income by using the other attributes as the input. The accuracy
of the model is measured by mean relative error (MRE),
MRE =
1
n
n∑
i=1
|zi − yi|
yi
, (18)
where yi is the real value, zi is the predicted value produced by
the network, and n is the number of tuples in the test dataset.
I 20 50 100 1000
Num. of communication rounds 443 190 152 193
TABLE II: The effect of the number of iterations I which
controls the frequency of updates. Each entry in the table gives
the necessary number of communication rounds to achieve
MRE 0.15 (N = 60, M = 30, K = 30, P = 0, and  = 1).
For the binomial classification task, like [24], we use the
MNIST and SVHN datasets as benchmarks. The MNIST
dataset consists of 28x28 images of handwritten digits with
60,000 training samples and 10,000 test samples. The SVHN
dataset consists of 32x32 images of house numbers with
73,527 training samples, 26,032 test samples and 10 classes.
We use the accuracy of classification to evaluate the perfor-
mance of these two models.
B. Experimental Setup
We use the popular neural network architectures: multi-layer
perceptron (MLP) with three fully-connected layers. For the
regression task, the activation functions of hidden layer and
output layer are ReLU and sigmoid function respectively. The
number of neurons in the hidden layer is 80. We use SGD as
the learning algorithm. The learning rate and the mini-batch
size are set to be 0.01 and 128, respectively. The weights of the
models are randomly initialized by normal distribution (with
mean 0 and standard deviation 1).
For both MNIST and SVHN datasets, we use a CNN with
two convolutional layers, two max-pooling layers, and one
hidden layer with 128 neurons. The activation of the output
layer is the sigmoid function. The other hyperparameters are
the same as the regression task.
Since the approaches proposed in [23] and [22] are not spe-
cially designed for collaborative learning, we mainly compare
all results with DSSGD in [24] and [30], and two baseline
approaches. The first is the centralized training on the entire
dataset, which is the basic approach that does not consider
privacy concerns and ought to have the best performance of
the model accuracy. The second is stand-alone training, which
trains solely on the local dataset without collaboration. We call
these two baselines Centralized and Stand-alone, respectively.
For simplicity, we abbreviate the method in [30] as CSDP
in the rest of this paper. All schemes are implemented on
TensorFlow. For SecProbe, we set the privacy budgets used in
participants’ sampling and perturbing objective functions to be
the same. We fine tune the parameters in DSSGD according
to [24] and use the settings with the best performance (the
parameter download ratio θd = 1, gradient bound γ = 0.001,
gradient selecting threshold τ = 0.0001).
To simulate the unreliable participants, we randomly choose
half of the participants and replace P fraction of their data with
random noise in the range [0,1]. We vary P to evaluate the
robustness of SecProbe against unreliable participants.
C. Results
The effect of I. Table II shows the effect of parameter I .
The results show that a larger I will speed up the training
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(a) N = 30 (b) N = 60 (c) N = 100
Fig. 4: A comparison of training convergences of all schemes for the regression task
(a) N = 30 (b) N = 60 (c) N = 100
Fig. 5: Training convergences of all schemes on MNIST
(a) N = 30 (b) N = 60 (c) N = 100
Fig. 6: Training convergences of all schemes on SVHN
convergence by increasing the computation loads on each
participant. However, a too large I will slow down the training
convergence since the collaboration decreases. Based on these
results, we set I to be 100 in the following experiments.
Training convergence. Figures 4, 5 and 6 show the training
convergence of all schemes for regression and classification
tasks respectively. We vary the number of participants N
in SecProbe and DSSGD, and set M = N , K = M ,
 = 1, and P = 0. The y-axis is the performance of trained
model, and the x-axis denotes the number of communication
rounds. Although Centralized achieves the highest accuracy
in all the settings, SecProbe can achieve almost the same
accuracy while providing a rigorous privacy guarantee. In US
and MNIST, Centralized has lower convergence rate than the
distributed schemes at the early stage. This may be because
that more data samples are used for each iteration for the
whole system, which can help accelerate the convergence in
the early stage of training. Our scheme also has a better
performance than DSSGD in terms of both convergence rate
and model accuracy in the regression task, and it has almost the
same performance in the classification task with more rigorous
privacy guarantee. The main reason is that only perturbing the
uploaded gradients is not enough to protect the training data,
and DSSGD consumes too much privacy budget in perturbing
all the gradient values. Moreover, the noise directly injected
to each gradient independently may also make the training
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(a) N = 30 (b) N = 60 (c) N = 100
Fig. 7: The effect of the number of participants (M ) selected per round on the system performance
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Fig. 8: The influence of the number of participants (M ) selected per round on the system performance
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Fig. 9: The robustness of SecProbe against unreliable participants
process unstable. In addition, on both MNIST and SVHN
datasets, SecProbe achieves a comparable performance with
CSDP and DSSGD in CNN when the fraction of uploaded
parameters θu is 1.
The effect of parallelism. The parameter M controls the
number of participants that the server chooses per round,
which can also be regarded as parallelism degree. We vary M
to be (0.1N, 0.3N, 0.5N, 0.7N, 1.0N ) and set K = M ,  = 1,
and P = 0. Note that the total size of training dataset does not
change with different values of M . As can be seen in Figure 7,
the increase of parallelism will speed up the convergence of
training, and it leads to a more accurate model while increasing
the communication loads. On the contrary, the decrease of
parallelism will reduce the number of accesses for each data
point. Briefly speaking, the size of M affects the amount
of data for training in each communication round and the
convergence speed. It is good to see that, when M = 0.1N it
can still achieve relatively accurate results. Based on the above
results, we choose M = 0.5N for the following experiments
to strike a good balance between efficiency and convergence
rate.
The effect of auxiliary validation set. To show the effect
of the auxiliary validation set on the system performance,
we re-design the training set and the test set to simulate
one or multiple special participants whose hypotheses are
not included at the server. More specifically, we exclude all
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Fig. 10: The influence of malicious participants
samples whose one attribute is within a certain range from
the original datasets, and put these excluded data to the special
participants and a special test set. Here we choose the attribute
Age due to its numeric form and its impact on the income. We
remove all samples with Age ≤ 0.25 or Age ≥ 0.7 from the
original datasets. We set the number of special participants as
1, 0.1N, and 0.2N respectively, and demonstrate the results
in Figure 8. We can see that the performance on the special
test set is significantly worse than that of the reliable test
set. With more special participants, the performance of the
special test set will improve due to the increasing contribution
of the special participants to the collaborative learning process.
Therefore, a special participant with high-quality dataset that
contains new findings can also play a role in improving the
model, even if it is misjudged by the server.
Certainly, the lack of the auxiliary validation dataset which
can provide good utility scores for all participants is a practical
limitation. However, this can be mitigated by choosing more
participants in each round, i.e., increasing the probability
that special participants are chosen. It can be observed from
Figure 8 that even if the special participants’ models do not
have good utility scores, the aggregated model can have the
increased performance on the special test set while rising the
proportion of special participants.
Robustness against unreliable participants. Figure 9
shows the results of the robustness against unreliable par-
ticipants. We vary the proportion of unreliable participants
R as (30%, 50%, 70%), and replace P proportion of their
data with random noise, and set M = 0.5N , K = 0.5M ,
and  = 1. We vary the total number of participants N and
the proportion P of the noise data, which means that one
half of the participants are unreliable with P fraction of
their data to be random noise. We set N = (30, 60, 100)
and P = (0.2, 0.4, 0.6). Correspondingly, for Centralized,
we set P = (0.1, 0.2, 0.3). For the number of sampling
participants K, we set it to be the half of M , which follows the
assumption that the majority of the participants are reliable. As
can be seen in Figure 9, the prediction accuracies of all the
other methods decrease quickly with the increase of noise,
and more unreliable participants will increase this impact,
since they are all lack of the strategy dealing with unreliable
participants/data. For Centralized and Stand-alone, they are
disturbed by the unreliable data directly. Specially, for DSSGD
Fig. 11: Accuracy vs. privacy budget  (N = 60, M = 30, K
= 15, and P = 0.2)
and CSDP, they randomly sample parameters/participants to
aggregate the model, under an equivalent sampling probabil-
ity. As a result, the unreliable participants will significantly
impact on the accuracy. Meanwhile, our approach SecProbe
achieves very high accuracy which is almost the same as
the performance of the case with no unreliable participants,
and it is also robust against the proportion of noise. The
experimental results validate the effectiveness of our scheme.
The influence of malicious participants. There may also exist
some malicious participants who may destroy the usability of
the aggregated model. We show the influence of malicious
participants by setting N = 60, M = 30, and K = 15,
and tuning the number of malicious participants from 10 to
50 at an interval of 10. The uploaded malicious parameters
are randomly set within [0, 1], as the abnormal values, e.g.,
tens or hundreds, can be easily detected and dropped out.
In Figure 10, we can see that the existence of malicious
participants disturbs the training process significantly, with
a fast convergence rate at the early stage of training and a
sudden stop followed. The potential reason is that even if only
one malicious participant is chosen, the randomly generated
parameters will disturb the learning process. Although the
performance of the trained model reduces gradually with the
increase of malicious participants, the prediction error is still
less than 0.2.
Similar to special participants, malicious participants can
influence the performance owing to their contribution in ag-
gregating the model. Therefore, it can also be mitigated by
tuning the number of chosen participants in each round to
exclude the malicious participants as much as possible.
Accuracy vs. privacy. We evaluate the effect of different
values of privacy budget  on the accuracy of the neural
network. Figure 11 shows the results compared with the
competitors. The x-axis represents the privacy budget per
training epoch (an epoch contains several iterations over all
training samples). It is shown that, a larger value of  results
in high accuracy while providing lower privacy guarantee.
SecProbe achieves almost the same results with Centralized
and outperforms Stand-alone when  ≥ 0.1.
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V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we took the first step to investigate the problem
of privacy-preserving collaborative deep learning system while
considering the existence of unreliable participants, and pre-
sented a new scheme called SecProbe. SecProbe utilizes expo-
nential mechanism and functional mechanism to protect both
the privacy of the participants’ data and the quality of their
data, the two major privacy concerns in such a system. The
experimental results demonstrated that SecProbe is robust to
unreliable participants, and can achieve high-accuracy results
which are close to the model trained in a traditional centralized
manner, while providing rigorous privacy guarantee.
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